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Note 
Better the Devil You Know?  
UK Alternatives to EU Membership 
Tim Peel 
As part of the Conservative re-election mandate and in 
response to growing unrest from anti-Europe members 
(“Euroskeptics”) within his own party, British Prime Minister 
David Cameron promised a United Kingdom-wide referendum 
on its membership in the European Union (“EU” or “Brussels”).1 
This marked the first time since 1975 the British people had 
been directly consulted about the UK’s relationship with 
Europe,2 and only the third time in the nation’s history the 
government had called a national referendum.3 Despite a closely 
fought contest,4 on June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom stunned 
 
  J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School (2017). The author 
would like to thank his wife, Kami, for her patient support as he embarks on a 
second career in law. 
 1. See The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015: Strong Leadership, A 
Clear Economic Plan, a Brighter, More Secure Future 30 (2015), https://s3-eu-
west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf 
[hereinafter Conservative Party Manifesto 2015]; Roger Liddle, The Risk of 
Brexit: Britain and Europe in 2015, at 13–14 (2015); Vaughne Miller et al., 
House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 07214, Exiting the EU: UK 
Reform Proposals, Legal Impact and Alternatives to Membership 8 (2016); 
David Cameron Promises In/Out Referendum on EU, BBC (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282. 
 2. Helen Wallace, The UK: 40 Years of EU Membership, 8 J. CONTEMP. 
EUR. RES. 532, 533 (2012). 
 3. See ELISE UBEROI, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 
07212, EUROPEAN UNION REFERENDUM BILL 2015–16 8 (2015), http://research
briefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7212/CBP-7212.pdf. 
 4. See Brexit Poll Tracker, FIN. TIMES, https://ig.ft.com/sites/brexit-
polling/ (last visited June 27, 2016) (displaying Brexit poll results from 
September 2015 to June 2016); Freddie Sayers, There Has Been a Move Toward 
Remain, But It Might Not Be Enough, YOUGOV, https://yougov.co.uk/
news/2016/06/21/there-been-move-toward-remain-it-might-not-be-enou/ (last 
visited June 27, 2016) (discussing poll results up until two days before the 
referendum vote). 
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Europe and most of the western world by voting to leave the 
European Union—a decision also known as “Brexit.”5 This Note 
seeks to explore two possible treaty arrangements available to 
the UK following Brexit. The background section will discuss the 
UK’s relationship with the EU, EU exit procedures, and will 
introduce alternative treaty options using Switzerland and 
Norway as case studies. The analysis section will assess the 
viability of each alternative in light of the UK’s current 
relationship with the EU and its aims for EU reform. Finally, 
this Note concludes that both the Swiss and Norwegian 
approaches are inferior to full EU membership. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE UK AND EUROPE 
The United Kingdom has a long history with continental 
Europe that extends hundreds of years into the past before the 
United Kingdom came into being in its current guise.6 In the 
context of this lengthy history, erstwhile enemies and 
competitors on the continent have only recently become the UK’s 
political and economic partners, while previous animosity and 
suspicion have not been entirely forgotten. 7 Consequently, the 
UK’s relationship with Europe and the EU in particular has 
often been politically contentious,8 and is perhaps better 
characterized as a marriage of convenience than one of 
endearing love and devotion.9 By way of modern example, more 
 
 5. See Anushka Asthana et al., UK Votes to Leave EU after Dramatic Night 
Divides Nation, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016, 02:51 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/britain-votes-for-brexit-eu-
referendum-david-cameron; Steven Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; 
Cameron Plans to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.ny
times.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-european-union-
referendum.html?_r=1; Brian Wheeler & Alex Hunt, The UK’s EU Referendum: 
All You Need to Know, BBC (June 26, 2016), http://www.alghad.com/
articles/974362-The-UKs-EU-referendum-All-you-need-to-know. 
 6. See generally Union with Ireland Act 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3 c. 67, pmbl., 
art. 1 (U.K.) (demonstrating that the UK did not come into being in its current 
format until the accession of Northern Ireland in the early 19th Century). 
 7. See, e.g., Sam Wilson, Britain and the EU: A Long and Rocky 
Relationship, BBC (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
26515129. 
 8. UBEROI, supra note 3, at 6. 
 9. See Matthias Matthijs, David Cameron’s Dangerous Game: The Folly of 
Flirting with an EU Exit, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 10, 12 (2013) (“The United Kingdom’s 
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people in the UK fail to see themselves as citizens of Europe than 
all but three of the EU’s twenty-eight member states.10 One 
academic suggests that Europe has always been a problem for 
Britain in a way that it has not for any other member state in 
the EU, striking at such pronounced British nerves as a strong 
national identity and a proud colonial history.11 
A conflicted approach to the EU has been evident from the 
very beginning of the European project, as the UK initially opted 
out of joining the European Community (an earlier iteration of 
the EU), only to change course entirely and apply to join several 
years later.12 However, the UK struggled to convince its 
European counterparts that it was a worthy, or rather, 
appropriate member of the European club and did not achieve 
accession to the European Community until approximately 10 
years later, in 1973.13 Further flip-flopping followed when the 
UK held a referendum a mere two years after its accession in 
which 67% of voters cast their ballots in favor of sticking with 
Europe rather than abandoning the European Community 
altogether.14 
In more recent times, despite recognizing the value of the 
free movement of goods and services known as the Single 
Market—possibly the UK’s chief purpose for EU 
membership15—the UK’s resistance to Europe continued with 
rejection of key policies such as the single currency,16 the 
 
relationship with Europe has never been warm, much less passionate; it is more 
like a loveless marriage [based] on cost-benefit analysis rather than rhetoric 
about a common European destiny . . . .”) (alteration in original). 
 10. See EUR. COMM’N, STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 82 PUBLIC OPINION IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, FIRST RESULTS 27 (Dec. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_first_en.pdf (indicating that 49% of those 
surveyed in the UK do not feel like citizens of the European Union). 
 11.  See Vernon Bogdanor, Professor Emeritus, Gresham College, Lecture 
on Britain and the Continent at Greshman C. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.
gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/britain-and-the-continent. 
 12. Wallace, supra note 2, at 532. 
 13. See Wilson, supra note 7 (noting that the UK’s application to the EEC, 
a precursor to the EU, was vetoed twice by then French President Charles de 
Gaulle). 
 14. See UBEROI, supra note 3, at 6. 
 15. David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, EU Speech at 
Bloomberg (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-
speech-at-bloomberg. 
 16. See Iain Begg, Could It Be ‘Brexpulsion’ Rather than ‘Brexit’?, 18 EUR. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2015). 
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Schengen agreement,17 the EU fiscal treaty,18 and joint police 
and criminal justice measures.19 In a further demonstration of 
its desire to keep the EU at arm’s length, Britain enacted the 
European Union Act, which required a national referendum to 
approve any further concession of power to the EU or 
amendment to existing EU treaties.20 The UK has strongly 
opposed surrender of sovereignty to Brussels21 and rejected 
outright the European ideal of an “ever closer union.”22 
The Eurozone crisis in 2011 and 2012, coupled with 
Brussels’ failure to take decisive steps to address the struggling 
economies of several member states, added to lingering 
discontent with the UK’s EU membership and breathed new 
wind into the sails of Euroskeptics within the Conservative 
Party.23 Calls for a straight in/out referendum grew louder, 
evidenced by a number of Private Members’ Bills to that end.24 
In 2013, David Cameron finally relented by announcing that a 
national referendum would be held on Britain’s continued 
membership in the EU25 and later renewed that promise in the 
2015 Conservative Party Manifesto.26 Following his successful 
reelection, Cameron originally committed to hold a referendum 
before the end of 2017,27 but brought the date forward to June 
 
 17. See id.; CONSERVATIVE PARTY EUROPEAN ELECTION MANIFESTO 2014, 
at 34 (2014), https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20
Files/MANIFESTO%202014/Large%20Print%20Euro%20Manifesto_English.a
shx (stating that the Conservatives have kept Britain out of the Schengen open 
borders area). 
 18. See Bruno Waterfield, EU Suffers Worst Split in History as David 
Cameron Blocks Treaty Change TELEGRAPH, (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ey/8945155/EU-suffers-
worst-split-in-history-as-David-Cameron-blocks-treaty-change.html.   
 19. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
 20. European Union Act 2011, c. 12 (U.K.). 
 21. See Philip Hammond, Britain’s Four-Point Package for EU Reform, 
POLITICO (June 10, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.politico.eu/article/britains-
four-point-package-for-eu-reform (noting that Britain’s EU membership has 
resulted in a loss of sovereignty causing public support for continued EU 
membership to be wafer thin). 
 22. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 1, Oct. 
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1; Cameron, supra note 15, at 6 (“We understand 
and respect the right of others to maintain their commitment to this goal [of an 
ever closer union]. But for Britain - and perhaps for others - it is not the 
objective.”) (alteration in original). 
 23. See LIDDLE, supra note 1, at 11–14. 
 24. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; UBEROI, supra note 3, at 31–32. 
 25. See Cameron, supra note 15. 
 26. CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO 2015, supra note 1, at 30. 
 27. Id. 
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23, 2016 on the back of “successful” negotiations with EU leaders 
concerning the UK’s EU membership.28 
B. THE UK’S RENEGOTIATED EU MEMBERSHIP 
In anticipation of the referendum, Cameron met with 
European leaders early in 2016 to renegotiate Britain’s EU 
membership and attempt to secure concessions in several policy 
areas.29 Cameron alluded to the main areas of focus for 
renegotiation in a number of earlier speeches and articles,30 and 
fleshed out the key points in a letter to the president of the 
European Council.31 UK demands included: rejection of an ever-
closer union (which contemplates restoration of parliamentary 
sovereignty), a curb on immigration into the UK from within the 
EU (including a freeze on social benefits to migrants), policies to 
ensure that non-Euro countries are not penalized for 
maintaining a different currency, and targets to reduce the 
burden of excessive EU legislation.32 The EU proved remarkably 
receptive and substantial agreement was achieved on many of 
the key policy areas.33 Having secured what he believed to be a 
 
 28. See EU Referendum: Cameron Sets June Date for UK Vote, BBC (Feb. 
20, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35621079. 
 29.
 See Jan Strupczewski & Elizabeth Piper, Cameron Hails EU Deal to Give Brit
ain ’Special Status’, Battle Looms, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2016, 3:25 AM), http://w
ww.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-idUSKCN0VS153; see also Cameron, 
supra note 15, at 6 (“It is wrong to ask the people whether to stay or go before 
we have had a chance to put the relationship right.”); Q&A: What Britain Wants 
from Europe, BBC (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
32695399. 
 30. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 15; David Cameron, David Cameron: The 
EU Is Not Working and We Will Change It, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 15, 2014, 9:00 
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700644/
David-Cameron-the-EU-is-not-working-and-we-will-change-it.html; see also 
Mark Leftly, EU Referendum: What are David Cameron’s Demands in the EU 
Talks?, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
politics/eu-referendum-what-are-david-cameron-s-demands-in-the-eu-talks-
a6725741.html (discussing the main points of negotiation Cameron planned to 
address with the EU). 
 31. Letter from David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, 
to Donald Tusk, President, European Council (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.gov/
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_
Tusk_letter.pdf [hereinafter Cameron Letter]. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Jennifer Rankin, David Cameron’s EU Deal: What He Wanted and 
What He Got, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2016/feb/19/camerons-eu-deal-what-he-wanted-and-what-he-got. 
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special status for Britain as a result of the renegotiation,34 
Cameron campaigned for the UK to remain in the EU.35 
Although the reaction to Cameron’s EU deal was mixed in some 
quarters36 and skeptical in others,37 Britain’s later vote to leave 
the EU effectively rendered the renegotiation meaningless. 
C. WITHDRAWAL REQUIREMENTS 
While the British people voted to leave the EU several 
months ago, in order to make its departure officially binding and 
for the withdrawal process to commence, Britain needed to 
trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union 
(“TEU”).38 While Article 50 governs withdrawal of a member 
state, it provides relatively sparse detail on the process.39 To 
withdraw, a member state must notify the European Council of 
its intention and negotiate an agreement covering the 
arrangements for withdrawal and its future relationship with 
the EU.40 The decision to leave does not require the formal 
agreement of other member states41 and there are no explicit 
conditions for withdrawal.42 Although the decision to withdraw 
from the EU does not require the agreement of other member 
 
 34. Strupczewski & Piper, supra note 29. 
 35. See Ivana Kottasova, UK Leader: Why Europe Is Good for Britain, 
CNNMONEY (Mar. 10, 2016, 11:41 AM), http://money.cnn.com/
2016/03/10/news/eu-uk-referendum-david-cameron/index.html; Heather 
Stewart et al., David Cameron Makes Final Plea for Britain to Remain in the 
EU, GUARDIAN (June 22, 2016, 2:46 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2016/jun/22/david-cameron-makes-final-plea-for-britain-to-vote-to-remain-in-
the-eu; EU Referendum: Cameron Sets June Date for UK Vote, supra note 28; 
Q&A: What Britain Wants from Europe, supra note 29. 
 36. See Cameron’s EU Deal: The Reaction at Home and Abroad, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 20, 2016, 3:18 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/20/
cameron-eu-deal-reaction-politicians-journalists. 
 37. See, e.g., Jon Stone, Tory MPs Brand David Cameron’s EU Deal ‘Thin 
Gruel,’ ‘Watered Down’ and Full of Broken Promises, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 3, 
2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-insists-
eu-deal-is-the-strongest-package-ever-but-his-own-mps-arent-impressed-
a6850941.html. 
 38. See Jennifer Rankin et al., What Is Article 50 and Why Is it So Central 
to the Brexit Debate?, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2016, 7:32 AM), http://www.the
guardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/article-50-brexit-debate-britain-eu. 
 39. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, supra note 
22, art. 50. 
 40. See id.. 
 41. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28. 
 42. See KLAUS DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF EUROPEAN LAW 18 
(2010), http://europa.eu/documentation/legislation/pdf/oa8107147_en.pdf. 
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states, international legal norms dictate that EU member states 
must consent to any withdrawal agreement.43 If no agreement is 
reached as to the manner in which the withdrawal will take 
place, withdrawal automatically becomes effective two years 
after notification of the intention to withdraw, unless the parties 
agree to an extension.44 No withdrawal agreement has been 
concluded under current EU treaty provisions.45 However, EU 
trade agreements with other nations have typically required 
longer than three years and frequently longer than five years to 
conclude.46 
Until withdrawal becomes effective, the withdrawing 
member state retains all the privileges of EU membership, 
except that it cannot participate in discussions about, nor vote 
upon the terms of any withdrawal agreement in the European 
Council.47 The absence of a UK vote on a withdrawal agreement 
may affect the voting balance of member states and, one report 
contends, grant the France-led protectionist bloc a significant 
majority sway.48 The EU would negotiate any agreement 
through the European Council, following a mandate from EU 
ministers acting by a qualified majority after obtaining consent 
 
 43. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28 (“There is no mention in Article 
50 TEU of ratification of the withdrawal agreement by Member States, but this 
would be necessary under international legal norms.”). But see STEPHEN BOOTH 
ET AL., OPEN EUROPE, WHAT IF . . . ? THE CONSEQUENCES, CHALLENGES & 
OPPORTUNITIES FACING BRITAIN OUTSIDE EU 14–15 (2015), http://2ihmoy1d3v
7630ar9h2rsglp.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/150507
-Open-Europe-What-If-Report-Final-Digital-Copy.pdf (noting that the approval 
of member states need not be unanimous, unless it cuts across policy areas 
within the preserve of member states, such as investment protection or 
elements of transport). 
 44. See BORCHARDT, supra note 42. 
 45. See HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, RESEARCH PAPER 13/42, 
LEAVING THE EU 5 (2013), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/
documents/RP13-42/RP13-42.pdf (quoting the President of the European 
Council who stated that a UK exit “would be legally and politically a most 
complicated and unpractical affair”); BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 14. 
 46. See BOOTH ET AL, supra note 43, at 15–16 (noting that an agreement 
with Canada commenced in 2009 and has yet to be concluded, while it took 
Switzerland approximately 10 years to conclude its bilateral arrangement with 
the EU). 
 47. See FLEXCIT: A PLAN FOR LEAVING THE EUROPEAN UNION 38 (July 
2016), http://www.eureferendum.com/documents/flexcit.pdf [hereinafter 
FLEXIT]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, supra note 22, 
art. 50 § 4; BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 14. 
 48. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 15. 
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from the European Parliament, the latter of which has veto 
power over the entire withdrawal agreement.49 
D. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES? 
The non-exhaustive table below demonstrates a variety of 
different treaty arrangements and trade agreements the EU has 
entered with countries throughout the world: 
 
Country EU Treaty Arrangement 
Norway, 
Lichtenstein, 
Iceland 
Agreement on European Economic Area (“EEA”) & 
European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) 
membership 
Switzerland Bi-lateral trade agreements & EFTA membership 
Turkey Customs Union Agreement 
Australia EU-Partnership Framework 
United States Bi-lateral trade agreements; work on 
comprehensive agreement (Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership). 
Argentina Mercosur Agreement 
South Africa Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement 
Canada Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement 
Source: European Commission50 
 
While the UK could feasibly have attempted to model its 
future relationship with the EU after any of the above treaty 
arrangements, Switzerland and Norway provide two 
particularly interesting case studies because each is an 
immediate European neighbor and significant trade partner, but 
has deliberately refused full EU membership. 
 
 49. See id. at 14; HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 45, at 10. 
 50. Aggregated from a number of individual country pages. See Countries 
and Regions, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
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1. The Swiss Approach 
Despite the importance of EU trade to its economy,51 in 1992 
Switzerland rejected membership in the EEA, which would have 
granted unrestricted access to the Single Market and provided a 
basis for commencing negotiations for full EU membership.52 
Instead, rather than formalizing its relationship with the EU 
through a single comprehensive treaty arrangement or through 
its membership in the European Free Trade Association, 
Switzerland negotiated a series of bilateral agreements that 
cover specific economic and social sectors.53 The most important 
of these agreements are known as Bilaterals I and II,54 which 
cover areas such as trade, aviation, research, transport, 
agriculture and the environment.55 
Switzerland does not have full access to the Single Market 
and no current agreement that covers services specifically, 
including financial services.56 Furthermore, the EU conditioned 
the bilateral approach upon Switzerland’s acceptance of the free 
movement of persons57 and inserted a “guillotine clause,” 
whereby, if any of the separate elements is breached, the 
remaining elements of the bilateral agreement cease to apply 
after a period of six months without resolution.58 
 
 51.  See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., 
SWITZERLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 21 (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.eda.
admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/EuropaeischeAngelegenheiten/S
chweiz-und-EU_en.pdf (noting that the EU is Switzerland’s most important 
trading partner). 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Switzerland, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/switzerland (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); see 
generally List of Treaties by Country: Switzerland, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/
world/agreements/searchByCountryAndContinent.do?countryId=3820&countr
yName=Switzerland (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
 54. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 24–25. 
 55. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., THE MAJOR BILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS SWITZERLAND EU 7, 17 (2016), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/
dea/en/documents/folien/Folien-Abkommen_en.pdf. 
 56. See CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUST., DOING THINGS BY HALVES? 
ALTERNATIVES TO UK EU MEMBERSHIP: LESSONS FROM SWITZERLAND AND 
NORWAY 11 (2013), http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/2133649/doing_things_by_
halves_- lessons_from_switzerland_and_norway_cbi_report_july_2013.pdf. But 
see BUS. FOR BRITAIN, CHANGE OR GO: HOW BRITAIN WOULD GAIN INFLUENCE 
AND PROSPER OUTSIDE AN UNREFORMED EU 240 (2015), http://forbritain.org/
cogwholebook.pdf (claiming that, even in the EU, the Single Market is 
underdeveloped for services). 
 57. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51. 
 58. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 26 (noting that the 
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Switzerland is required to make economic contributions to a 
variety of social cohesion programs, in addition to the programs 
in which it participates directly.59 Recent estimates indicate that 
Switzerland contributes approximately £420 million (or 
approximately $520 million as of November 2016) annually, 
which is lower than the UK’s net contributions to the EU on 
either an aggregate or per capita basis.60 
Few give serious credence to the Swiss approach as a viable 
alternative treaty arrangement for the UK.61 The principal 
challenges with this approach include EU dissatisfaction with 
the bilateral model, the static nature of bilateral agreements, 
and serious uncertainty over the nature of an agreement the UK 
could secure for itself under this model.62 By contrast, other 
commentators find virtue in the bilateral model, noting that it 
retains some access to the Single Market,63 at least partial 
sovereignty,64 and flexibility to pursue trade agreements with 
third countries.65 
2. The Norwegian Approach 
Norway maintains a close relationship with the EU despite 
rejecting full membership in two separate national referenda.66 
 
guillotine clause applies to Bilaterals I, which contain the agreement on the free 
movement of persons). 
 59. See, e.g., ARABELLA THORP, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, STANDARD 
NOTE SN06090, SWITZERLAND’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU 6 (2011), 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06090/SN06090.pdf ; 
MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 40–43; BOOTH EL AL., supra note 43, at 57. 
 60. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 43. 
 61. See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 41; BREXIT, supra note 47, at 
48–50; BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 57–61. 
 62. See FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 48–50; CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH 
INDUSTRY, supra note 56, at 13. But see IAIN MANSFIELD, A BLUEPRINT FOR 
BRITAIN: OPENNESS NOT ISOLATION 9 (2014), http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/
default/files/publications/files/Brexit%20Entry%20170_final_bio_web.pdf 
(suggesting that the best alternative to EU membership for the UK lies 
“somewhere between that of Turkey’s and Switzerland’s: [sic] membership of 
EFTA . . . .”); BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56 (stating that many of the 
criticisms of the Swiss model do not stand up to scrutiny). 
 63. See CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, supra note 56, at 10; 
THORP, supra note 59, at 3. 
 64. See, THORP, supra note 59, at 5 (noting that none of Switzerland’s 
agreements with the EU transfers any legal or decision making authority to a 
supranational body). 
 65. See BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 239. 
 66.  ARABELLA LANG, 
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Like Switzerland, Norway is a member of the EFTA, which aims 
to promote free trade between its members (consisting of 
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) and the EU.67 
EFTA membership is not required to enter trade agreements 
with the EU, but is a prerequisite to joining the EEA.68 Norway’s 
additional membership in the EEA permits full access to the 
Single Market.69 
In return for access to the Single Market, the EU, through 
the EEA agreement, requires Norway to adopt a significant 
portion of the acquis communitaire (“acquis”), the accumulated 
body of European law, including the free movement of persons, 
capital, goods and services, known as the “four freedoms.”70 EEA 
membership also requires adoption of “flanking” policies in areas 
horizontal to the four freedoms, such as labor law, consumer 
protection, and environmental policy,71 but excludes common 
policies in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, trade (with third 
countries), security, and the establishment of a customs union.72 
The absence of full integration in these latter areas allows 
Norway some discretion to set its own policies and to enter into 
trade agreements with other countries without the EU’s consent 
or involvement.73 All in all, it is estimated that Norway has 
adopted approximately three-fourths of the EU’s acquis as a 
direct result of EEA membership,74 in addition to having 
 
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, STANDARD NOTE 6522, NORWAY’S RELATIONSH
IP WITH THE EU 2 (2013), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/
documents/SN06522/SN06522.pdf. 
67. See generally The European Free Trade Association, EFTA, http://www.efta.
int/about-efta/european-free-trade-association (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) 
(providing background information on the European Free Trade Association). 
 68. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 84 (noting that there is no necessity for the 
UK to join the EFTA in order to negotiate bilateral agreements with the EU); 
BOOTH EL AL., supra note 43, at 56 (noting that accession to the EEA must be 
preceded by joining the EFTA). 
 69. See generally The Basic Features of the EEA Agreement, EFTA, 
http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement/eea-basic-features (last visited Nov. 14, 
2015) (describing the role of the European Economic Area); Countries and 
Regions: Norway, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/norway (last visited Nov 14, 2015) (explaining 
Norway’s trade situation policies and statistics). 
 70. Id.; see also Agreement on the European Economic Area, Jan. 3, 1994, 
1994 O.J. (L 1) 1 (stating the four freedoms). 
 71. FOREIGN AFF. COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: UK 
GOVERNMENT POLICY, 2013–14, HC 87-II, at 52 (UK). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 56. 
 74. LANG, supra note 66. 
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concluded a further 74 voluntary agreements with the EU 
outside the EEA framework.75 
In contrast with the Swiss bilateral arrangement, the EEA 
agreement is dynamic in the sense that new policies are 
automatically integrated into an open-ended annex to the 
agreement.76 Despite this, EEA countries can exercise a right of 
reservation, or veto, which, at least in theory, permits outright 
rejection of any specific piece of EU legislation an EEA member 
deems objectionable.77 However, EEA members are expected to 
make “every effort to find a mutually acceptable solution where 
a serious problem arises in any area.”78 Norway has no official 
say in the development or implementation of EU policy,79 but is 
permitted to give input at various junctures,80 and makes a 
concerted effort to exert its influence in the early stages of policy 
development through lobbying.81 
Like Switzerland, Norway is required to make monetary 
contributions to a variety of EU social programs and is the single 
largest contributor among EEA member countries.82 Norway’s 
annual contributions in 2013 were estimated at approximately 
€600 million (or $650 million), making it the tenth largest 
contributor to EU programs despite lacking full-fledged EU 
member status. Norway’s contributions represent a little over 
half of the UK’s per capita contributions as an EU member.83 
Experts generally favor Norway’s EFTA/EEA treaty 
arrangement over Switzerland’s bilateral approach. 84 Those 
 
 75. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 7. 
 76. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 6. 
 77. Id. at 7. 
 78. Agreement on the European Economic Area, supra note 70, at 102. 
 79. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 8. 
 80. Id.; see also NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., NORWAY AND THE 
EU – PARTNERS FOR EUROPE 16–17 (2011), 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/eu/norge_og_eu_2
011.pdf (noting EU invitations to participate in several EU bodies). 
 81. See JONATHAN LINDSELL, CIVITAS: INST. FOR THE STUDY OF CIVIL 
SOC’Y, THE NORWEGIAN WAY: A CASE STUDY FOR BRITAIN’S FUTURE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU 40 (2015), http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/
TheNorwegianWay (stating that, while it is true that Norway has no voice or 
representation on every EU committee, “[i]t has plenty of input.”). 
 82. See NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 80, at 18 
(reporting that Norway contributed approximately €1.79 billion between 2009-
2014 to reduce social and economic disparities within the EEA). 
 83. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 7. 
 84. Compare FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71, at 54 (noting that the 
EEA Agreement is often considered a second best solution to both closer or 
looser ties with the EU), and CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 
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who are supportive of the Norwegian approach point to 
undiminished access to the Single Market,85 reduced monetary 
contributions to the EU86 and a stronger voice on the 
international stage.87 Conversely, critics suggest that EU red 
tape would remain with EEA membership,88 while the UK would 
also lose its power to shape and influence policy,89 a phenomenon 
sometimes referred to as a “democratic deficit.”90 In addition, 
some question whether the UK’s size, profile, and objectives are 
sufficiently similar to other EFTA/EEA countries to warrant 
joining their ranks.91 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. WITHDRAWAL 
Whatever alternative EU arrangement the UK considers, it 
will first need to begin with withdrawal from the EU. While the 
EU recognizes Article 50 of the TEU as the official means for 
withdrawal, no member state has ever gone through this 
process. Consequently, because the withdrawal process and its 
outcome are conjectural, several commentators have suggested 
that the UK should negotiate an exit outside the EU treaties.92 
This could be accomplished by relying upon the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), a 
United Nations agreement that, inter alia, provides guidance for 
the abrogation of treaties between states.93 Some commentators 
contend that the Vienna Convention would allow the UK to 
 
56, at 9 (concluding that the Norwegian model would not work for the UK), with 
NORTH, supra note 47, at 55 (“The UK will have to adopt an ‘off-the-shelf’ option 
and the best one on offer is the EEA agreement.”), and LINDSELL, supra note 
81, at 83 (“The Norwegian approach to the European Union offers a genuine 
alternative to consider.”). 
 85. See, e.g., BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 233. 
 86. See, e.g., CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 7. 
 87. See, e.g., LINDSELL, supra note 81, at 27, 30. 
 88. See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39. 
 89.  See, e.g., JOHN SPRINGFORD ET AL., 
CTR. FOR EUROPEAN REFORM, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LEAVING 
THE EU 32 (2014), http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/
attachments/pdf/2014/report_smc_final_report_june2014-9013.pdf. 
 90. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 67 (explaining that the democratic 
deficit is a major drawback to the EEA/EFTA arrangement). 
 91. See, e.g., FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71, at 54–55. 
 92. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 38. 
 93. Id. 
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bypass formal negotiations contemplated in TEU Article 50 and 
provide a stronger platform for the UK to dictate the course of 
proceedings.94 However, the legal principle of lex specialis 
derogat legi generali is likely to apply, whereby greater weight 
is given to the more specific of two or more treaty provisions that 
touch upon the same subject matter.95 In addition, any attempt 
to negotiate outside the framework set forth in the EU treaties 
would likely aggravate European powers and damage the UK’s 
chances of maintaining positive future relations with the EU.96 
Consequently, despite the attendant uncertainty, it is likely that 
the UK will have to negotiate through the Article 50 framework. 
B. THE SWISS BILATERAL MODEL 
Switzerland’s bilateral approach comports with a classic 
form of government cooperation,97 but is somewhat unique in 
that it comprises a collection of individual agreements, rather 
than a single treaty covering a broad swathe of policy areas.98 
Although some authors assert the contrary, Switzerland’s 
membership in the EFTA is not a prerequisite to the bilateral 
approach and did not significantly influence the structure of its 
treaty arrangement with the EU.99 Consequently, the UK would 
not need to join the EFTA in order to negotiate a comparable 
bilateral model.100 However, while the bilateral approach is 
available as a theoretical alternative treaty arrangement, it has 
some significant practical limitations. 
1. Sovereignty 
On its face, the bilateral approach appears to have 
preserved sovereignty in certain policy areas and the freedom to 
reject some EU proposals outright. In some respects, then, the 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See BOOTH EL AL., supra note 43, at 16 (stating that unilateral 
withdrawal through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should not 
be used “[u]nless the UK is truly prepared to ‘go it alone’”) (alteration in 
original). 
 97. See CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 10. 
 98. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 43 (indicating that 
Switzerland has concluded 120 agreements with the EU). 
 99. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 59. 
 100. Id. (noting that EFTA membership is not required to pursue the “Swiss 
option”). 
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bilateral approach appears to have given Switzerland the ability 
to determine the areas in which it wants to cooperate with 
Europe and those where the national interest is such that it 
wishes to remain autonomous.101 The structure of the bilateral 
approach not only preserves Swiss sovereignty for policy areas 
outside the bilateral agreements, but also extends to policy areas 
falling squarely within the bilaterals by avoiding transfer of any 
legal or decision-making authority to the EU as a supranational 
body.102 This contrasts with the experience of EU member states 
whose domestic laws and even national constitutions are 
expected to yield in the event of conflict with EU legislation or 
directives.103 In addition, each party to the bilateral agreements 
is responsible for implementation of the terms in its own 
territory.104 Hence, at least on paper, the degree of sovereignty 
Switzerland has been able to retain appears impressive and 
would appeal to the UK, given its sense that it has conceded too 
much power to Brussels as a consequence of EU membership.105 
However, Swiss sovereignty is more illusory than real. In 
practice, Switzerland must adopt a wide range of EU rules and 
policies on a voluntary basis in order, for example, for its 
businesses to have continued access to the EU import market.106 
Indeed, one author estimates that approximately 40% of Swiss 
legislation is derived from the EU,107 a striking estimate 
considering that Switzerland has specifically opted out of 
cumbersome EU policies, such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy (“CAP”) and Common Fisheries Policy (“CFP”).108 As 
another author notes, “[i]f support for the Swiss model in the UK 
is motivated by a desire to escape EU regulation, then the former 
is certainly not the way to pursue that objective.”109 Crucially, 
the Swiss model requires adoption of EU rules and regulation, 
voluntarily or otherwise, without any say or influence over their 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See John Henry Dingfelder Stone, Agreeing to Disagree: The Primacy 
Debate Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Justice, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L. 127, 129 (2016). 
 104. THORP, supra note 59, at 5. 
 105. See Cameron, supra note 30 (noting that powers should not always flow 
to Brussels). 
 106. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 12. 
 107. NORTH, supra note 47, at 48. 
 108. See THORP, supra note 59, at 2. 
 109. FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71, at 73. 
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development.110 The irony here is that “an arrangement meant 
to protect Switzerland’s autonomy is actually eroding it.”111 
Further, when Switzerland has attempted to fully assert its 
supposed sovereignty by rejecting a particular policy, the EU has 
reacted strongly with the threat of sanctions and a full review of 
its treaty obligations.112 
2. Free Movement of Persons 
The EU specifically conditioned the bilateral approach upon 
acceptance of the free movement of persons,113 which is likely to 
remain a condition were the UK to pursue a similar treaty 
arrangement. Data from 2013 indicate that approximately 23% 
of Switzerland’s population is foreign versus only 13% of the 
population of England and Wales, leading one author to conclude 
that the bilateral approach offers no particular advantage with 
respect to immigration.114 Although Switzerland accepted the 
free movement of persons as a central element of its treaty 
arrangement with the EU when the Bilaterals originally became 
effective, it has since become a contentious issue domestically.115 
Matters came to a head in 2014 when Swiss voters approved an 
initiative to restrict the free movement of persons in derogation 
of Bilaterals I:116 an initiative similar in intent to the UK’s 
proposal to restrict immigration from within the EU.117 In 
response, the EU threatened to reduce Switzerland’s access to 
EU institutions and the Single Market, and cancel Bilaterals 
I.118 Although the EU has yet to carry out the more serious 
 
 110. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39. 
 111. FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71, at 72. 
 112. See UE Warns Switzerland All Treaties Will Be Reviewed After Anti 
Immigration Vote, EURONEWS (Sep. 2, 2014), http://www.euronews.com/2014/
02/09/eu-warns-switzerland-all-treaties-will-be-reviewed-after-anti-
immigration-vote. 
 113. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 21. 
 114. See FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 62. 
 115. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 29–30 (explaining 
that the Swiss government introduced tighter immigration measures following 
the accession of 10 EU member states in 2004 and Swiss voters approved an 
initiative against mass immigration in 2014). 
 116. See id. 
 117. See Cameron Letter, supra note 31. 
 118. See, e.g., EU Warns Switzerland All Treaties Will Be Reviewed After 
Anti-Immigration Vote, supra note 112; Nicola Forster & Ivo Nicholas Scherrer, 
Switzerland and the EU: The Heavy Cost of Isolation, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 
20, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/student-reporter/
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elements of these threats, its reaction suggests limited scope for 
Britain to seriously negotiate the free movement of persons to its 
advantage and virtually precludes its outright prohibition. 
3. The Single Market 
Switzerland’s access to the Single Market appears adequate 
on its face, but the absence of a provision covering services, 
specifically financial services, will be of particular concern to the 
UK.119 Because the UK’s economy is heavily services-
dependent120 and houses the EU’s largest and most important 
financial center,121 access to the Single Market would need to 
include services to have any real value to the UK.122 In an 
attempt to secure broader market access than Switzerland, the 
UK could invoke its trade deficit with the EU123 or relative 
economic power as the fifth largest economy in the world.124 
However, despite any gains in leverage this might bring over 
Switzerland’s position, the EU remains a more important 
market for the UK than does the UK to the EU.125 Consequently, 
there is no guarantee that the bilateral model would provide the 
kind of market access the UK requires. In any event, consistent 
with the Swiss experience, the EU is likely to require 
concessions in the form of EU regulation and monetary 
contributions as a prerequisite to access to the Single Market. 
 
switzerland-and-the-eu-th_b_5003363.html. See also Jon Henley, Whatever You 
Do, Don’t Become Switzerland, Academics Tell UK, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2015),  
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/nov/11/whatever-you-do-dont-
become-switzerland-swiss-academics-tell-uk (explaining that funding for 
academic research has experienced severe cuts following the Swiss vote on EU 
immigration quotas). 
 119. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 12. 
 120. Id. at 4. 
 121. See LONG FIN., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTRES INDEX 15, at 5 tbl.1 
(2014), http://www.longfinance.net/images/GFCI15_15March2014.pdf; 
SPRINGFORD ET AL., supra note 89, at 49. 
 122. See SPRINGFORD ET AL., supra note 89 (noting that services account for 
an unusually high proportion of UK exports). 
 123. Id. at 28. 
 124. See, e.g., News Release, Ctr. for Econ. & Bus. Research, World Economic 
League Table 2016 Highlights, 4 tbl.1 (Dec 26, 2015), http://www.cebr.com/welt-
2. 
 125. Compare MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 11, with Jonathan Porter, 
After Brexit: How Important Would UK Trade Be to the EU?, NAT. INST. ECON. 
& SOC. RESEARCH (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/after-brexit-
how-important-would-uk-trade-be-eu. But see MANSFIELD, supra note 62, at 14 
fig.1 (demonstrating that UK trade with the EU has declined over time). 
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Indeed, for the type of broad access the UK would prefer, the EU 
may require more extensive concessions, similar to those it 
currently requires of EEA member countries. 
4. EU Bilateral Aversion 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the bilateral approach is a 
strong EU aversion to this type of treaty arrangement.126 For 
example, in 2012, the European Council reported that “the 
approach taken by Switzerland to participate in EU policies and 
programmes through sectoral agreements in more and more 
areas in the absence of any horizontal institutional framework, 
has reached its limits and needs to be reconsidered.”127 The 
Council added: “[A]ny further extension of this system would in 
addition bear the risk of undermining the EU’s relations with 
the EEA EFTA partners.”128 One author suggests that part of 
the problem with the bilateral approach is that it is not a 
“conscious, studied arrangement, but a series of ad hoc 
responses” to Swiss rejection of full EU membership.129 Whether 
or not this observation is entirely accurate, one can reasonably 
conclude that the bilateral model is an aberration, and the EU 
has little stomach to see another treaty develop along similar 
lines.130 Hence, given EU aversion to the bilateral approach in 
general and a stated dislike for policy “cherry picking” 
characteristic of the approach in particular,131 any attempt by 
the UK to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements is likely to 
prove futile. 
C. BILATERAL SUMMARY 
The Swiss option does not represent a significant 
improvement over the UK’s current arrangement with the EU, 
 
 126.  See Council of the European Union “I/A” Item Note 17151/12, Draft 
Council Conclusions on EU Relations with EFTA Countries ¶ 31 (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-17151-2012-INIT/en/pdf. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 48. 
 130. Id. (noting that the Swiss model is seen as an exception, rather than a 
formal model). 
 131.  Id. at 39 (quoting Criticism from Berlin: Merkel Sees “Significant 
Problems” Arising from the Swiss Vote, DER SPIEGEL (Feb. 10, 2014, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/merkel-sieht-probleme-nach-schweizer-
votum-zur-zuwanderung-a-a952533.html).  
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and is in some ways inferior. For example, the bilateral 
agreements have not adequately curtailed immigration, given 
an estimated four-fold net EU immigration increase as compared 
with the UK.132 Likewise, while Switzerland has experienced 
some reduction in the imposition of EU regulation, it is still 
obligated to adopt a significant portion of EU rules with limited 
say in their development. Even the apparent bright spot of Swiss 
sovereignty is of little practical use if, when exercised, it 
threatens the existence of other elements of the treaty 
arrangement. 
D. THE NORWEGIAN (EEA) MODEL 
EEA membership largely dictates Norway’s treaty 
arrangement and relationship with the EU. Rather than an 
alternative path to EU membership, some see the EEA as a 
stepping-stone to prepare countries for full accession to the 
EU.133 Iceland provides some support for this theory, having 
formally applied for EU membership in 2009, although it has 
since withdrawn from negotiations.134 As an initial matter, given 
the UK’s vote to withdraw from the EU, it is unlikely to be 
enthusiastic about a treaty arrangement that echoes the very 
sentiment of the “ever closer union”135 it sought to escape. Other 
elements of the EEA approach offer some advantages over the 
bilateral model, but ultimately fail to adequately satisfy UK 
objectives.136 
1. The Single Market 
As a member of the EEA, Norway’s access to the Single 
Market is more substantial than Switzerland’s. Indeed, 
Norway’s access to the Single Market is no greater (or worse) 
than the UK’s current access as a full-fledged EU member state, 
but, like Switzerland, has the advantage of exclusion from CAP, 
 
 132. BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 59. 
 133. FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71. 
 134. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: 
Iceland, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-
information/iceland/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2016). 
 135. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, supra note 
22. 
 136. See generally Cameron Letter, supra note 31 (laying out UK reform 
objectives); Rankin, supra note 33 (reviewing Cameron’s reform objectives). 
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CFP and some other policy areas.137 Aside from offering superior 
domestic control over policy areas outside the EEA Agreement, 
perhaps the greatest strength of the EEA approach is that it 
comprises an “off-the-shelf” solution .138 This type of solution 
would allow the UK to remain in the Single Market with 
virtually all of the privileges it currently enjoys.139 Moreover, 
because the UK already has the technical measures in place as 
a fully-fledged member of the EU, an off-the-shelf approach 
would allow it to seamlessly adopt most, if not all, of the EEA 
Agreement in a relatively short space of time.140 In contrast, the 
Swiss approach would involve time-consuming and human 
capital-intensive negotiation of a series of individual agreements 
that may impose unique technical demands.141 
2. Democratic Deficit 
Superior market access, however, comes at a price in the 
form of substantial adoption of the acquis, including the four 
freedoms,142 together with additional rules the EU periodically 
adds to the annex of the EEA Agreement.143 In one respect, the 
UK would be no worse off by following the Norwegian approach 
because, in most instances, the EU already requires acceptance 
of rules and legislation as a signatory to EU treaties. However, 
like the bilateral model, as a member of the EEA, the UK would 
no longer have the ability to influence or veto legislation (the 
democratic deficit).144 Whether this represents a significant 
disadvantage when compared with the status quo is a matter of 
debate. For example, one report suggests that a democratic 
deficit is also present in the EU,145 while another questions the 
value of the UK’s existing veto power and its ability to influence 
legislation even with full EU member status.146 While it is true 
 
 137. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 60. 
 138. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 55. 
 139. BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 50. 
 140. See FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 55. 
 141. See BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 241. 
 142. Id. at 236. 
 143. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 6. 
 144. See FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71. 
 145. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 21 (noting that the only way to mitigate 
the democratic deficit among EU member states is to reinforce the role of 
national parliaments). 
 146. See LINDSELL, supra note 81, at 27 (explaining that Britain attempted 
to use its veto power in 2011 to no effect). 
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that EEA members have a veto right for unreasonable EU rules 
in theory,147 the right has rarely been invoked148 and certainly 
not in connection with rules the EU regards as sacrosanct and 
central to its very purpose.149 Consequently, the veto right may 
be of little practical use to the UK. 
Thus, in actuality, the difference between the democratic 
deficit experienced by an EEA member versus an EU member 
states may be more imagined than real, although one could 
argue that a direct seat on the various EU councils is 
qualitatively preferable, even if not quantitatively measurable. 
But even if any potential democratic deficit under the EEA 
model would render the UK no worse off, the broad objective of 
Brexit is to secure a more favorable position, especially with 
respect to EU regulation.150 
3. Sovereignty 
Under the EEA Agreement, the UK is unlikely to enjoy 
significant repatriation of sovereignty. While the UK would 
regain control over its agricultural and fisheries policies, among 
others, the requirement for EEA members to adopt significant 
portions of the acquis would prevent the UK from significantly 
altering its domestic policies with respect to immigration, a 
central demand in its recent renegotiation efforts with the EU.151 
Likewise, burdensome EU legislation and red tape would 
continue to affect the UK as an EEA member, which requires 
flanking policies in addition to adoption of fundamental policies 
such as the four freedoms.152 The likelihood is that this would 
mean cumbersome EU rules that UK businesses have identified 
as particularly burdensome, such as the Working Time 
Directive, would remain in effect.153 
 
 147. See BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 234. 
 148. See LINDSELL, supra note 81, at 53–54 (noting that in all but a few 
cases, use of the reservation or veto by EEA/EFTA members has been averted). 
 149. The only time Norway appears to have flirted with exercising its veto 
right was in connection with an EU postal directive. See LINDSELL, supra note 
81, at 58–60. Contrast this with the EU’s reaction to Switzerland’s attempt to 
renege on its commitment to the free movement of persons. See, e.g., Forster & 
Scherrer, supra note 118; Henley, supra note 118. 
 150. See Cameron, supra note 30. 
 151. See Cameron Letter, supra note 31. 
 152. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 6. 
 153. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39. The Working Time Directive is an 
EU policy that places restrictions on the maximum number of working hours 
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One area in which the EEA model permits greater exercise 
of sovereignty is on the international stage. Several 
commentators note that EEA membership would provide the UK 
with greater influence in international bodies.154 While not a 
central UK concern in terms of its relationship with the EU, the 
ability to voice its own issues and agenda on the international 
stage, as distinct from those of the EU, could be a valuable asset 
and may help foster expansion of trade and treaty arrangements 
with countries outside the EU. 
E. EEA SUMMARY 
Like the Swiss approach, the EEA model fails to fully 
address the UK’s central concerns with the EU and falls some 
distance short of the desired outcome. While some see the 
Norwegian approach as a viable alternative to EU 
membership,155 it offers few substantive advantages and some 
significant drawbacks. 
One particular drawback is that there is arguably less scope 
for reform under the EFTA/EEA Agreements than under the 
bilateral approach and, even if there was such a scope, there is 
no guarantee that existing members want to move the EEA in 
the same direction as the UK.156 For example, a UK attempt to 
modify the existing EEA Agreement to include equal voting 
rights with full EU members (referred to as an EFTA/EEA-lite 
model by some authors)157 is unlikely to prove successful because 
the EU’s distaste for cherry picking, expressed in connection 
with the bilateral approach, would apply with equal force in the 
EEA/EFTA context. Put another way, the EU is unlikely to 
extend equal privileges without equal obligations. Furthermore, 
changes to the EEA model as it currently exists would require 
alteration to the governing treaties, which can only be 
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basics of the Working Time Directive); Working Conditions: Working Time 
Directive, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706
&intPageId=205&langId=en (last visited Aug. 29, 2016). 
 154. See, e.g., BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 234; LINDSELL, supra note 
81, at 27–30. 
 155. See, e.g., FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 51. 
 156. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 56–57 (noting the potential tensions 
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 157. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 63–68. 
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accomplished with unanimous approval of EEA members and 
EU member states.158 Perhaps because of these and other 
imperfections, one author characterizes the EEA model as a 
“halfway house.”159 However, the orientation of EEA/EFTA 
members appears to be halfway towards the EU, rather than 
away from it. Such an orientation is unlikely to correspond with 
the UK’s long-term objectives if it elects to leave the EU.160 
III. CONCLUSION 
The choice UK voters faced to leave the EU was one of 
enormous significance with the potential for wide-ranging 
consequences that will be felt by generations to come. Even as 
narrowly conceived, Brexit is likely to impact such diverse areas 
as business, trade, agriculture, the justice system, and the rights 
of British citizens living at home and abroad, to name a few. 
Broader implications include the UK’s place in the world, the 
impact upon the EU, and even the continued existence of the 
United Kingdom. Few times in the UK’s history has a 
government granted its citizens the opportunity to shape its 
future destiny in such dramatic fashion. 
This Note has considered two alternative options the UK 
might consider in place of full EU membership. This Note 
concludes that the Swiss bilateral approach is largely an 
anomaly and faces a considerable uphill battle to continue to 
function in its current form. The Swiss approach is cumbersome 
and disjointed and does not sit well with the EU preference for 
closer unity and cooperation across a range of policy areas. The 
Norwegian approach offers some advantages over the bilateral 
model and provides a much greater degree of stability. However, 
in reality, the Norwegian model more closely resembles full EU 
membership and retains many of the shortcomings the UK 
either wishes to escape or reform. In summary, the gains to be 
realized from either approach are marginal and cannot justify 
the significant upheaval and uncertainty withdrawal from the 
EU is likely to cause. While in the near term at least, the better 
outcome of the referendum may have been for Britain to remain 
within the EU and to concentrate its efforts on producing 
 
 158. Id. at 67. 
 159. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 55. 
 160. But see id. (stating that, “if EEA membership can be a halfway house 
for countries wishing to join the EU, it could serve equally well in reverse.”). 
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meaningful reform, that proverbial ship has sailed. Instead, 
Britain must now carefully consider how it will shape its future 
relations with its most immediate neighbors. Whether the UK 
can secure for itself a more advantageous arrangement with the 
EU and a brighter future remains to be seen. 
